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U.S. corporations hold significant amounts of cash on their balance sheets, and these cash holdings
have been justified in the existing empirical literature by transaction costs and precautionary motives.
An additional explanation, considered in this study, is that U.S. multinational firms hold cash in their
foreign subsidiaries because of the tax costs associated with repatriating foreign income. Consistent
with this hypothesis, firms that face higher repatriation tax burdens hold higher levels of cash, hold
this cash abroad, and hold this cash in affiliates that trigger high tax costs when repatriating earnings.
Estimates indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the tax burden from repatriating foreign
income is associated with a 7.9% increase in the ratio of cash to net assets.  In addition, certain firms,
specifically those that are less financially constrained domestically and those that are more technology
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  U.S. corporations hold significant amounts of cash.  At the end of fiscal 2004, 
cash represented 10.5% of the aggregate assets of all Compustat firms.  While this is a 
large percentage, for many firms, the dollar value of cash holdings was also large.  For 
example, at the end of 2004 cash holdings of Microsoft, General Motors, Ford, General 
Electric, Exxon Mobil, and Pfizer were respectively $60.6 billion, $36.0 billion, $33.4 
billion, $23.2 billion, $23.1 billion, and $19.9 billion.  This paper develops and tests the 
hypothesis that the magnitude of corporate cash holdings is, in part, a consequence of the 
tax incentives faced by U.S. multinational companies.  The U.S. and many other 
countries tax the foreign income of their firms, but these taxes can be deferred until 
earnings are repatriated.  As a result, U.S. multinational firms have an incentive to retain 
earnings abroad, and to a large extent, these firms hold these funds in cash. 
  The existing academic literature on cash holdings has paid little attention to the 
potential impact of the incentives created by taxes associated with repatriations.  The 
earliest explanations offered by academic research were based on trade-offs motivated by 
transactions costs.  These theories suggest that firms hold cash to avoid the cost of being 
short liquid assets.  Baumol (1952), Tobin (1956), Meltzer (1963), Miller and Orr (1966), 
and Karni (1973) develop this argument.  Building on this work, Mulligan (1997) finds 
evidence of economies of scale in cash holdings.  Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson (1999) provide evidence that the precautionary incentive to hold cash is 
increased when asymmetric information or agency costs make it difficult for firms to 
raise external capital and Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2006) argue that recent increases in 
cash holdings can be explained by increases in the precautionary motives for holding 
cash.  More recent work links changes in cash holdings to these motives.  In particular, 
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) show that financially constrained firms 
increase cash holdings by larger amounts when cash flow is high, or, put differently, that 
constrained firms have a higher cash flow sensitivity of cash.
1 
                                                 
1 Another related line of research examines cash from an agency perspective.  Jensen (1986), and 
Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1994) consider the hypothesis that managers who have access to 
liquid assets employ these assets in a manner that is not in the interests of the shareholders.  Other studies 
present evidence of an association between shareholder rights and cash holdings [Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, 
and Servaes (2003)], differences in the market value of cash due to agency problems [Dittmar and Mahrt-  2
  In this paper we explore the possibility that the tax costs associated with 
repatriations contribute to the magnitude of cash holdings.
2  Generally speaking the U.S. 
taxes the foreign operations of domestic firms and grants tax credits for foreign income 
taxes paid abroad.  For most U.S. affiliates, these taxes are equal to the difference 
between foreign income taxes paid and tax payments that would be due if foreign 
earnings were taxed at the U.S. rate, and they can be deferred until earnings are 
repatriated.  These tax burdens create incentives for U.S. multinationals to retain earnings 
abroad and, if they do not have attractive investment opportunities, to hold the retained 
earnings as cash.    
Using a large sample of firms over the period 1982 to 2004, drawn from 
Compustat, our analysis first considers if firms that face higher tax costs of repatriating 
earnings hold higher levels of cash.  Next, since repatriation tax burdens should only 
influence cash held abroad, it is informative to study the effect of these tax costs on cash 
held in distinct locations.  Data drawn from the detailed results of the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) annual survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad contain 
information on domestic and foreign cash holdings.  These data are employed to test if 
taxes triggered by repatriations increase foreign cash holdings and if they have an effect 
on domestic cash holdings.  If tax incentives increase foreign cash holdings and foreign 
cash is a substitute for domestic cash holdings, then repatriation taxes would reduce 
domestic cash holdings.  The BEA data also contain information on cash held by each 
affiliate of U.S. multinational firms, and these data are used to analyze if individual 
affiliates that face the higher tax costs associated with repatriating earnings hold higher 
levels of cash than other affiliates of the same firm.  Finally, further analysis is conducted 
at the affiliate level to determine if certain kinds of firms exhibit levels of cash holdings 
that are particularly sensitive to repatriation tax burdens. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Smith (forthcoming), Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (forthcoming), Kalcheva and Lins (2006), and 
Pinkowitz and Williamson (2006)], and the effect of cash on mergers and acquisitions and corporate 
performance [Harford (1999), Mikkelson and Partch (2003)]. 
2 While the focus of our analysis is the impact of taxes on cash holdings, our study is also related to 
previous work that has examined the impact of taxes on many parts of the firm, including capital structure 
[Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004b), Froot and Hines (1995), Graham (1996a, 1999, 2000), Newberry (1998), 
Newberry and Dhaliwal (2001)], dividend payouts [Graham, Michaely and Roberts (2003)], hedging policy 
[Graham and Rogers (2001)], merger behavior [Hayn (1989)] and earnings management [Krull (2004)]. 
See Graham (2003) for a review of the role of corporate and personal taxes on the financing, dividend and 
hedging decisions of the firm.   3
Our empirical work confirms results presented in the existing literature and yields 
four main findings on the relation between taxes and cash holdings.  First, firms that 
incur higher tax costs when repatriating earnings hold more cash.  Estimates predict that a 
one standard deviation increase in the tax costs associated with repatriations is associated 
with a 7.9% increase in the ratio of cash to net assets (defined as total assets minus cash). 
This result is robust across a variety of measures for the repatriation tax burden and 
specifications that analyze levels of cash holdings as well as changes in cash holdings.  
Second, repatriation tax burdens induce firms to hold more cash abroad.  The 
median firm facing an above average repatriation tax burden holds 47% of its cash 
abroad, but the median firm facing a below average repatriation tax burden holds only 
26% of its cash abroad.  Measures of increased repatriation tax burdens derived from the 
BEA data are associated with increases in foreign cash holdings, but they are 
insignificant in explaining domestic cash holdings.  Our tests therefore do not have 
sufficient power to conclude that these tax burdens reduce domestic cash holdings.     
Third, affiliates that trigger high tax costs when repatriating earnings hold higher 
levels of cash than other affiliates of the same firm.  Nuanced tests compare the cash 
holdings of incorporated affiliates to that of foreign branch affiliates, which are not 
separate legal entities from their parents.  This comparison is enlightening because the 
earnings of branches are taxed by the U.S. as they are earned, not as they are repatriated.  
Therefore, multinationals do not have a tax incentive to retain earnings in the form of 
cash in branches located abroad.  Our findings indicate that incorporated affiliates in 
lower tax jurisdictions have higher cash holdings but that affiliates that are organized as 
branches hold lower levels of cash that do not vary with host country tax rates.  These 
results are robust to the inclusion of parent firm fixed effects that control for 
unobservable time invariant firm characteristics that might affect cash holdings. 
Finally, certain types of firms exhibit distinctive sensitivities of affiliate cash 
holdings to repatriation tax burdens.  Firms that are financially constrained domestically 
in the sense of having high levels of domestic leverage and below investment grade (or 
no) debt ratings are less likely to defer taxes associated with repatriations by holding cash 
abroad.  Their affiliate cash holdings are low and are not related to host country tax rates 
in a statistically significant way.  Technology intensive firms, however, appear to have   4
affiliate cash holdings that are particularly sensitive to the tax costs triggered by 
repatriations.  Previous work suggests that these firms have more flexibility to shift 
profits to low tax locations, and this flexibility appears to increase the sensitivity of the 
cash holdings of the affiliates of these firms to host country tax rates. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides details 
about how the U.S. tax code applies to the foreign earnings of U.S. multinational firms 
and its implications for corporate cash holdings.  Section III describes the data and 
defines the proxies for repatriation tax burdens used in the empirical tests.  Section IV 
presents the empirical results, and Section V concludes.  
 
 
2. Repatriation Tax Burdens and Cash Holdings 
 
The U.S. tax code affects the incentives of firms to hold foreign earnings abroad 
or to repatriate them, and in addition, it influences the decision of whether investments in 
liquid securities should be made domestically or abroad.  This section describes the tax 
rules that apply to the international activities of U.S. multinationals and explains their 
implications for corporate cash holdings. 
  
2.1. Taxation of U.S. Multinationals 
 
Nearly all countries tax the income of corporations that operate within their 
borders.  In addition, the U.S. and other countries tax the foreign income of their 
residents.  However, to avoid double taxation of foreign income, U.S. law grants tax 
credits for foreign income taxes paid abroad.  U.S. multinationals are permitted to defer 
U.S. tax liabilities on certain foreign profits until they are repatriated.  This deferral is 
available only on the profits of foreign affiliates that are separately incorporated in 
foreign countries.  The profits of branches, which are unincorporated foreign affiliates, 
are taxed immediately by the U.S. 
Generally speaking, the taxes due upon repatriation are equal to the difference 
between foreign income taxes paid and tax payments that would be due if earnings were 
taxed at the U.S. rate.  For example, if the U.S. tax rate is 35% and a U.S. multinational   5
earns $100 abroad and pays $20 in host country income taxes, an additional $15 would be 
due in U.S. taxes when the earnings are repatriated.  If foreign income taxes paid exceed 
the amount that would be due if earnings were taxed at the U.S. rate, then no additional 
taxes are due. 
There are some important caveats to this generalization.  First, the extent to which 
firms can avoid U.S. taxes through deferral is limited.  Under the Subpart F provisions of 
the U.S. law certain kinds of income, classified as “passive income,” are “deemed 
distributed” and therefore immediately taxable by the U.S. even if it is not repatriated.  
Passive income includes interest income and dividends received from investment in 
securities.  While firms have discretion in classifying foreign cash holdings as being 
necessary for their business operations and thus not subject to passive income tax 
treatment, considerations related to Subpart F provisions are salient when considering 
where firms should hold liquid, interest bearing securities.  
It should also be noted that total U.S. tax obligations are determined by 
worldwide averaging.  This approach allows firms that pay tax rates above the U.S. tax 
rate in a particular jurisdiction to use the foreign tax credits from this jurisdiction to 
shield income repatriated from low tax locations from U.S. taxation.  However, these 
foreign tax credits cannot be used to reduce tax obligations related to income earned 
within the U.S.  Firms that have total foreign tax payments that exceed the amount that 
would be due if U.S. tax rates were applied to total taxable foreign income are 
characterized as having excess foreign tax credits.  Excess credits from one year can be 
used to reduce U.S. taxable income related to foreign earnings in either of two previous 
years or five subsequent years.  
Other aspects of a firm’s tax status may reduce payments required for U.S. tax 
obligations on foreign source income.  Tax credits associated with net operating losses 
(or investment tax credits earned prior to their repeal) can be used to offset payments due 
on foreign source income.  Generally speaking, firms that face the alternative minimum 
tax (AMT) also have lower repatriation costs than they would if they were to face regular   6
taxes as a consequence of the lower statutory rate applied under the AMT.
3  T h e s e  
considerations indicate the relevance of using a firm’s marginal tax rate when considering 
the effects of tax incentives on aggregated repatriations from all affiliates to a parent.  
 
2.2. Implications for Corporate Cash Holdings 
 
Existing empirical evidence indicates that multinational firms are more likely to 
retain earnings in low tax jurisdictions.
4  Hines and Hubbard (1990) find that in a sample 
of U.S. multinational firms drawn from 1984 tax return data, a one percent decrease in 
the repatriation tax is associated with a four percent increase in dividend payments by 
foreign subsidiaries.  Similarly, Grubert (1998) and Grubert and Mutti (2001), using 1990 
and 1992 tax return data, find that repatriations are sensitive to tax considerations.  Desai, 
Foley, and Hines (2001, forthcoming) find that affiliates of U.S. multinationals located in 
low tax jurisdictions have lower dividend payout ratios.  Specifically, the payout ratios of 
incorporated affiliates vary with host country tax rates, but the payout ratios of branches 
do not.   
Furthermore, despite the tax treatment of passive income, firms choosing to invest 
earnings from a low tax foreign jurisdiction in cash either at home or in the low tax 
jurisdiction often have an incentive to hold this cash in the low tax jurisdiction.  To 
illustrate this point, consider the case of an incorporated affiliate that earned $100 and 
pays $20 in foreign income taxes.  If the firm repatriates these earnings immediately, it 
pays an additional $15 in U.S. taxes and then can invest the remaining $65 in the liquid 
security.  Any earnings associated with this investment are taxed at the U.S. rate.   
However, if the firm does not repatriate the earnings, it will be able to invest $80 in the 
liquid security.  While Subpart F regulations require the firm to pay U.S. taxes on 
                                                 
3 Although there are situations in which the AMT can increase the cost of repatriating earnings, in most 
cases the costs are identical or lower under the AMT. Lyon and Silverstein (1995) explain the effects of the 
AMT on multinational behavior in detail. 
4 Under a restrictive set of assumptions, U.S. tax code would not affect the decision to repatriate earnings 
immediately or at a later time.  Applying the trapped equity view of dividend taxation, Hartman (1985) 
illustrates that retaining earnings for a finite period of time would not avoid tax obligations.  Although 
retaining foreign earnings might reduce immediate U.S. tax obligations, future U.S. tax obligations would 
be higher.  Empirical evidence suggests that the assumptions in Hartman (1985) do not reflect the realities 
of the experience of U.S. multinationals.  Changes in corporate tax rates and changes in the excess foreign 
tax credit of multinationals give rise to incentives to retain earnings in low tax jurisdictions.   7
earnings associated with this investment, the firm will be better off holding cash abroad 
because by doing so it defers the repatriation taxes on the original $100 of earnings which 
are active earnings. 
Taken together, the findings of previous work and the principles of the U.S. tax 
code suggest that multinational firms that face high repatriation tax burdens should retain 
a greater share of their earnings abroad.  Unless there are immediate funding needs, some 
part of these earnings is likely to be held in the form of cash.  Within firms, the tax 
incentives giving rise to these patterns of behavior should be operative for separately 
incorporated affiliates, but they should not have effects on the behavior of affiliates that 
are organized as branches.  Affiliates with this organizational form should therefore have 
lower cash holdings and their cash holdings should not be a function of the tax rates of 
their host countries.   
Finally, multinationals have incentives to shift income to low tax jurisdictions 
through their production location decisions and transfer pricing choices.
5  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that technology intensive firms can shift income to low-tax 
jurisdictions more easily than other types of firms for at least two reasons.    First, 
technology intensive firms typically have high profit margins and intangible assets like 
intellectual property that are easy to transfer within the firm.   Affiliates in low tax 
jurisdictions can purchase intellectual property from the parent while it is under 
development, thus allowing firms to avoid taxes on profits generated by technologies that 
prove to be successful.   Secondly, even if the U.S. parent retains ownership of the 
intellectual property, technology firms are likely to have significant latitude in allocating 
earnings to countries with low taxes through royalty payments or transfer pricing.   
If affiliates produce goods that make use of intangible property developed by the U.S. 
parent, tax law requires the affiliate to make a royalty payment to the parent that reflects 
                                                 
5 An extensive literature indicates that multinationals are able to shift profits to low tax jurisdictions.  This 
literature analyzes patterns of reported profitability and intrafirm trade of U.S. multinational firms.  See, for 
example, Grubert and Mutti (1991); Harris, Morck, Slemrod and Yeung (1993); Klassen, Lang and 
Wolfson (1993); Hines and Rice (1994); Collins, Kemsley, and Lang (1998); Clausing (2001); and Desai, 
Foley, and Hines (2004a); this literature is critically reviewed in Hines (1999).  Some low-tax jurisdictions 
are so valuable to multinationals from a tax avoidance standpoint that they have been identified by the IRS 
and other sources as being “tax havens.”  Desai, Foley, Hines (2006) analyzes the use of havens by U.S. 
multinationals and finds that nearly 60% of U.S. firms with substantial foreign operations had an affiliate 
presence in a tax-haven country.   8
that market value of the intangible property and that covers some of the fixed costs of 
producing it, but tax authorities find it particularly difficult to assess if firms assign fair 
values in these cases.  Similarly, when an affiliate buys a good produced by the parent to 
distribute it elsewhere, it is supposed to pay a transfer price that would be paid by 
unrelated parties, but these transfer prices can also be difficult to assess.  As a 
consequence, technology intensive firms are likely to have higher levels of retained 
earnings held as cash and to exhibit a higher sensitivity of affiliate cash holdings to host 
country tax rates.  This argument suggests that the observed tendency of R&D intensive 
firms to hold cash may be generated from tax considerations rather than the precautionary 
or transactions costs motivations discussed in the existing literature.   
While these arguments predict that repatriation tax burdens will affect corporate 
cash holdings, the tax on repatriated earnings may have no effect on cash balances for a 
variety of reasons.  First, even if the tax law leads firms to retain earnings in their 
overseas subsidiaries, firms may increase investment rather than cash holdings.
6  Second, 
if firms target an overall cash balance, they may hold less cash in the U.S. to offset the 
cash they view as trapped overseas. Third, firms have various tax avoidance strategies at 
their disposal, and they may use them to make repatriation taxes irrelevant.  For example, 
affiliates in low tax environments can lend to or invest in another foreign affiliate.  When 
an affiliate buys the equity of another affiliate that was owned by the parent, the firm can 
return cash to the U.S. without triggering repatriation taxes.  If these kinds of strategies 
are effective and not too costly, one would find no relation between firms' cash holdings 
and their tax costs due to repatriation.  These possibilities form the basis for our null 
hypothesis of no relation between taxes and cash holdings. 
 
                                                 
6 As discussed in Section 2, U.S. tax law contains provisions designed to encourage re-investment of 
earnings rather than holding cash. These provisions prevent U.S. multinational firms from deferring the 
taxes due on earnings of passive investments like interest and dividends received from investments in 
securities. Passive income is deemed distributed, and therefore immediately taxable in the U.S., even if not 
repatriated as dividend payments.  Earnings reinvested in active business operations are not subject to these 




The data used in the analysis below are drawn from two primary sources.  This 
section begins by describing these two sources and the measures of cash holdings that are 
computed using them.  Then it explains in detail how proxies for the tax burden of 
repatriations are calculated. 
 
3.1. Cash Holdings and Multinational Activity 
 
Our initial sample is drawn from Compustat.  It covers the period 1982 through 
2004 and includes all firm-years with at least $100 million in assets in 1984 real dollar 
terms.  Firms that are not incorporated in the U.S. are excluded from the sample because 
U.S. repatriation tax obligations do not apply to them.  To be consistent with previous 
work, financial firms are excluded because these firms must meet statutory capital 
requirements and hold inventories of marketable securities that are included in cash.   
Utility firms are also excluded because their cash holdings are subject to regulatory 
supervision in many jurisdictions. 
  Following Opler et al. (1999), the primary dependent variable used in the analysis 
below is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash to net assets (defined as total assets less 
cash), Ln(Cash/Net Assets).  When using the Compustat data, we employ Data Item 1, 
defined as cash and short-term investments, as our cash measure.  This measure is a 
consolidated measure of cash holdings. 
Our analysis of the Compustat sample also accounts for several variables that 
have been shown to affect cash holdings in the existing literature.  In illustrating the 
importance of transactions cost and precautionary motives for holding cash, Opler et al. 
(1999) show that firms with strong growth opportunities and riskier cash flows hold more 
cash.  As proxies for the former, we use the ratio of the book value of equity to the 
market value of equity (shares outstanding times price per share), labeled Book Value of   10
Equity/Market Value of Equity,
7 and the ratio of research and development expenses to 
total assets, R&D Expenditures/Total Assets.  Following Opler et al. (1999), we set this 
variable to zero if the numerator is missing in Compustat.  To measure the volatility of 
cash inflows, we follow Opler et al. (1999) and calculate the Standard Deviation of 
Operating Income, which is equal to the standard deviation, over the sample period, of 
the ratio of the firm's earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation to total assets.
8 
Opler et al. (1999) also shows that firms that have the greatest access to capital, 
like large firms and firms that pay a dividend, hold less cash.  To control for this 
consideration, we include the Log of Assets, the natural logarithm of total assets as a 
proxy for firm size and Dividend Dummy, an indicator variable that equals one if the firm 
pays a dividend in a given year and zero otherwise.  In addition to these variables, Opler 
et al. (1999) also control for capital expenditures and leverage.  As a measure of 
investment, we include Capital Expenditure/Total Assets, the ratio of capital expenditures 
to total assets, and as a measure of leverage we include Market Leverage, which is equal 
to the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity.  
At the overall corporate level, Compustat covers both multinational and purely 
domestic firms.  The two data items of particular value to the analysis presented below 
are Pretax Income—Foreign (Data Item 273) and Income Taxes—Foreign Current (Data 
Item 64).  Pretax Income—Foreign represents the income of a company’s foreign 
operations before taxes.  Income Taxes—Foreign Current represents the current amount 
of income taxes payable to foreign governments.  These data items are only reported by 
some firms, and there are no other indicators of the extent of a firm’s foreign operations.
9  
The analyses presented in Tables 2 and 3 are therefore conducted using two samples that 
are constructed making distinct assumptions—one sample is generated without adjusting 
                                                 
7 To reduce the potential impact of outliers we winsorize this variable at the 1% level in each tail of the 
distribution. Even though most of our other independent variables are also calculated as ratios, upon 
inspection they are not subject to outlier problems. 
8 Opler et al. (1999) estimate both industry and firm-level cash flow standard deviation using the previous 
twenty years.  Limitations on the duration of our sample prevent us from adopting the same approach; 
rather, we estimate a contemporaneous standard deviation over the full sample period.  To obtain cross-
sectional variation, we construct this at the firm level. 
9 Security and Exchange Commission regulations stipulate that firms should separately report foreign 
activities in each year that foreign assets or revenues or income exceed 10% of total activities.  These 
regulations also require firms to report foreign income taxes if these exceed 5% of total income before 
taxes.   11
the raw data and the other is generated assuming that missing values of foreign income 
and taxes are equal to zero, as would be the case if firms with missing values were purely 
domestic firms without foreign operations. 
In our tests, we recognize that firms with more foreign income, all else equal, may 
hold more cash, even in the absence of our tax effect.  First, a delay between when the 
cash from earnings is received and when it is used generates a mechanical positive 
relation between cash holdings and income.  Second, firms with more foreign businesses 
may require more precautionary cash holdings if investment opportunities abroad are 
greater or more volatile than domestic opportunities, or alternatively, if raising capital for 
foreign operations is more difficult.  To control for these effects, we include the ratios of 
pre-tax foreign and domestic income to total assets, Foreign Income/Total Assets and 
Domestic Income/Total Assets, in our regression tests.  The first panel of Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics for all of the variables that are computed from Compustat data and 
used in the analysis below. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
More detailed data on multinationals are drawn from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) annual survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad.  These data provide a 
panel of data on the financial and operating characteristics of U.S. multinational firms 
operating abroad.  U.S. direct investment abroad is defined as the direct or indirect 
ownership or control by a single U.S. legal entity of at least ten percent of the voting 
securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or the equivalent interest in an 
unincorporated foreign business enterprise.  A U.S. multinational entity is the 
combination of a single U.S. legal entity that has made the direct investment, called the 
U.S. parent, and at least one foreign business enterprise, called the foreign affiliate.  As a 
result of confidentiality assurances and penalties for noncompliance, BEA believes that 
coverage is close to complete and levels of accuracy are high. 
The survey forms that U.S. multinational enterprises are required to complete 
cover both domestic and foreign operations, and they vary depending on the year, the size 
of the affiliate, and the U.S. parent’s percentage of ownership of an affiliate.  Although   12
many data items like net income and assets are collected for a broad sample on an annual 
basis, data on cash holdings are only available for larger affiliates and their parents in 
1982, 1989, 1994, and 1999, when BEA conducted benchmark surveys.  In these years, 
surveys captured information on the cash holdings of individual subsidiaries located in 
different countries and the domestic cash holdings of U.S. multinationals.
10  C a s h  i s  
defined to include deposits in financial institutions and other cash items.  In order to 
analyze the BEA data in conjunction with Compustat data these data sets are merged 
using IRS issued employer identification numbers. 
In addition to providing information on cash holdings in distinct locations, the 
BEA data are also the source of the detailed controls used in the analysis of affiliate cash 
holdings.  The controls include identifiers indicating if individual affiliates are organized 
as branches and therefore subject to unique tax treatment.  They also provide domestic 
parent and affiliate level data on the scale of operations, R&D expenditures, capital 
expenditures, leverage, and returns.
11  These variables are used to control for factors that 
affect cash holdings through alternative channels than the channel of repatriation taxes.  
The bottom panel of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables constructed 
using the BEA data. 
 
3.2. The Tax Burden of Repatriations 
 
Ideally, in order to identify the impact of repatriation taxes on cash holdings, one 
would like to know if affiliates are organized as branches, the value of accumulated 
foreign affiliate earnings, and the tax costs of repatriating these accumulated earnings.  
Large sample systematic data on these items are not available, so it is necessary to 
employ proxies and conduct a variety of indirect tests.
 12 
                                                 
10 In 1982, 1989, and 1994, all affiliates with an absolute value of sales, assets, or net income in excess of 
$3, $15, and $50 million respectively and their parents were required to report cash holdings.  In 1999, all 
majority owned affiliates and parents with an absolute value of sales, assets, or net income in excess of 
$100 million were required to report cash holdings. 
11 To reduce the potential impact of outliers, Affiliate Net Income/Affiliate Assets, the Standard Deviation of 
Affiliate Net Income/Affiliate Assets,  Domestic R&D/Domestic Assets,  Affiliate R&D/Affiliate Assets, 
Affiliate Capital Expenditures/Affiliate Assets, and Affiliate Leverage are winsorized at the 1% level in each 
tail of the distribution. 
12 In their tax footnotes, many firms do report the value of accumulated earnings that they do not anticipate 
repatriating.  These are classified as permanently reinvested earnings.  Krull (2004) uses hand collected   13
The Compustat data do not provide detailed information about where 
multinationals have foreign operations, but they do include information about the levels 
of foreign income taxes paid and foreign pretax income.  With these data, it is possible to 
compute a proxy for the tax burden associated with repatriations that we refer to as the 
Tax Costs of Repatriating Earnings.  This variable is computed by first subtracting 
foreign taxes paid from the product of a firm's foreign pretax income and its marginal 
effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b). Then the maximum of this difference 
or zero is scaled by total firm assets.  This proxy for the repatriation tax burden is 
appropriate for use in analysis of levels of cash holdings if accumulated earnings are 
proportional to current earnings and foreign tax rates are similar to those charged when 
accumulated earnings were taxed abroad.  However, these assumptions may not hold.  
Earnings or foreign tax rates may change so that the Tax Costs of Repatriating Earnings 
best reflect the tax costs of repatriating earnings in only a single period.  To address this 
issue, the analysis in the next section studies the effects of the Tax Costs of Repatriating 
Earnings on changes in cash holdings in addition to levels of cash holdings.  For the Tax 
Costs of Repatriating Earnings to be a reasonable proxy, most affiliates must also be 
incorporated entities and not branches.  The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that, 
according to the BEA data, only 6.4% of affiliate observations are observations of 
affiliates organized as branches. 
Although Section 2.1. indicates that a firm’s marginal tax rate is the relevant rate 
to consider when computing the Tax Costs of Repatriating Earnings, estimates of these 
rates require making a number of assumptions, as explained in Graham (1996b).  It is 
therefore informative to compute proxies for repatriation tax burdens using U.S. statutory 
rates.  The Alternative Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings is computed in the same way as 
the Tax Costs of Repatriating Earnings, but with U.S. statutory tax rates used in place of 
marginal tax rates.   
The BEA data include detailed information about where firms have foreign 
operations, so it is possible to use these data in conjunction with data on subsidiary host 
country tax rates to compute the effective tax rate a firm would face if it were to 
                                                                                                                                                 
data on earnings retained abroad and classified as permanently reinvested for 267 firms and shows that this 
designation is used to manage earnings.  Collins, Hand, and Shackelford (2001) collect permanently 
reinvented earnings data on 340 firms and study how the market values these earnings.   14
repatriate its earnings.  The Effective Repatriation Tax Rate is computed by first taking 
the maximum of zero and the difference between the weighted foreign tax rate a firm 
faces and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b), and then 
multiplying this value by the share of firm activity that is generated abroad.  Assets and 
other accounting items do not provide clean bases for weighting tax rates and computing 
the share of firm activity abroad because of potential double counting problems.  For 
example, part of a subsidiary’s assets is financed by equity invested by the parent, which 
appears as an asset on a parent’s balance sheet.  Therefore, the analysis employs two 
variables for weighting and computing shares that are not subject to double counting: net 
property plant and equipment and employment. 
Unlike the Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings variable, the Effective Repatriation 
Tax Rate is not based on a single year of foreign earnings.  It is related to stocks of firm 
activity, and therefore it is reasonable to analyze how it affects levels of cash holdings.  
In addition, because the BEA data on parent and subsidiary cash holdings are not 
collected on an annual basis, it is not possible to study changes in parent and subsidiary 
cash.  The Effective Repatriation Tax Rate is an appropriate measure of the repatriation 
tax burden if accumulated earnings are proportional to the level of firm activity in distinct 
jurisdictions.  Accumulated earnings may, however, be higher in low tax locations, 
reflecting the incentives of multinationals to engage in transfer pricing.
13  The Tax Costs 
of Repatriating Earnings proxy for the repatriation tax burden is not subject to this 
concern because it is computed using measures of foreign income.  The Alternative 
Effective Repatriation Tax Rate variables are computed using U.S. statutory tax rates in 
place of marginal tax rates.  Descriptive statistics for all the proxies for the repatriation 
tax burden appear in Table 1. 
  Fig. 1 presents the median ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated 
total assets less consolidated cash holdings for firms that face above and below average 
Effective Repatriation Tax Rates.  As is evident from the figure, firms facing higher 
repatriation tax burdens hold more cash.  The median firm facing above average effective 
                                                 
13 The Effective Repatriation Tax Rate might be a poor proxy for the tax burden of repatriation if levels of 
affiliate activity do not indicate levels of accumulated earnings because of differences in affiliate age.  
Robustness tests address this possibility.  This proxy is also imperfect if foreign tax rates differ from those 
charged when accumulated earnings are taxed.  The analysis of changes in cash holdings below is not 
subject to this concern.   15
repatriation tax rates holds 6.7% of net assets in cash, while the median firm facing below 
average effective repatriation tax rates holds only 4.6% of net assets in cash.  While 
illustrative, the comparison in Fig. 1 does not control for a variety of other factors that 
have been shown to affect cash holdings.  The analysis in the next section attempts to do 
so. 
 




  The analysis in this section first considers the effects of repatriation tax burdens 
on consolidated cash holdings.  Then it explores the extent to which these tax costs affect 
foreign and domestic cash holdings.  Finally, it studies the effects of these costs on the 
cash holdings of individual affiliates of the same firm and conducts tests that reveal if 
certain types of firms exhibit distinctive response to repatriation tax costs. 
 
4.1. Consolidated Cash Holdings 
 
  Table 2 presents the results of specifications that include the above mentioned 
proxies for the precautionary motives that were considered in Opler et al. (1999) along 
with proxies for the repatriation tax burden.  The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated total assets less 
consolidated cash holdings.
14  Each specification includes fixed effects for each industry 
(using two-digit SIC codes) and each year.  The sample used in columns 1 and 3 covers 
all Compustat firms, assuming that firms that do not report foreign income or foreign 
                                                 
14 Similar results are obtained if instead the dependent variable is computed as the natural logarithm of one 
plus the ratio of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated total assets less consolidated cash holdings, 
which would mitigate the effect of taking the log of ratios that are very close to zero.  Similar results are 
also obtained if one addresses outliers by winsorizing the ratio of consolidated cash holdings to 
consolidated total assets less consolidated cash holdings at the 1% level in each tail of the distribution.   16
income taxes do not have foreign income or pay foreign taxes, and the sample used in 
columns 2 and 4 includes only those firms that report foreign income and foreign taxes.
15 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
  The coefficient on the Tax Costs of Repatriating Earnings variable in columns 1 
and 2 is positive and significant.  The 16.56 coefficient on the Tax Costs of Repatriating 
Earnings in column 2 implies that a one standard deviation increase in the Tax Costs of 
Repatriating Earnings is associated with a 7.9% increase in the ratio of cash to net assets.  
Very similar results are also obtained if the Alternative Tax Costs of Repatriating 
Earnings (computed using U.S. statutory rates) is used, as in columns 3 and 4.  Tax costs 
associated with repatriating foreign earnings appear to increase corporate cash holdings. 
  Across the specifications in Table 2, the coefficients on Domestic Income/Total 
Assets and Foreign Income/Total Assets are positive, indicating that firms that are more 
profitable hold more cash.  However, the coefficients on Foreign Income/Total Assets are 
of a much larger magnitude, and they all differ from zero by a statistically significant 
amount while those on Domestic Income/Total Assets do not.  Therefore, aggregate cash 
holdings appear to be especially sensitive to fluctuations in foreign income.   
  The other variables in Table 2 have coefficients that are similar to those estimated 
elsewhere.  Large firms and firms that pay dividends hold less cash.  These results have 
been interpreted as indicating that firms with a greater ability to access capital—because 
they are larger or can cut their dividend—have less of a need to hold cash.  Firms with 
strong growth opportunities (or low Book Value of Equity/Market Value of Equity) and 
higher standard deviations of operating income hold more cash.  Firms with high levels 
of R&D expenditures also hold more cash.  These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that cash is especially valuable to firms with high investment needs and 
volatile earnings because external finance is costly.  The coefficient on Capital 
Expenditures/Total Assets is negative and significant, which may reflect that as firms 
pursue profitable investment opportunities, cash holdings are depleted, giving rise to a 
                                                 
15 Only a limited number of firms report foreign income and foreign income taxes in 1982 and 1983, so 
missing values are not replaced with zeros in these years when creating the sample used in columns 1 and 
3.   17
negative contemporaneous relationship.  The coefficient on Market Leverage is also 
negative and significant, suggesting that firms that make extensive use of debt also hold 
low levels of cash.   
The Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings provides a direct measure of the tax costs 
associated with earnings in just a single year, and it may not reflect the tax burden of 
repatriating accumulated earnings.  In order to address this issue, the specifications in 
Table 3 analyze marginal changes in cash over a single year, using the change in the ratio 
of consolidated cash holdings to consolidated total assets less consolidated cash 
holdings.
16  As in Table 2, all the specifications include industry and year fixed effects, 
and the first and third specifications are run on samples that include all Compustat firms 
and the second and fourth are run on samples of just firms reporting foreign pretax 
income and foreign income taxes. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The coefficients on the Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings in specifications 1 and 
2 are again positive and significant.  The 1.0540 coefficient on the Tax Cost of 
Repatriating Earnings reported in column 2 indicates that a one standard deviation 
increase in the Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings is associated with a 0.0050 change in 
the ratio of cash to net assets.  This estimate implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in the Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings increases the level of Cash/Net Assets 
by 7.7% of its median value of 0.0650.  The economic significance of the results 
presented in Table 3 is therefore very similar to the economic significance of the results 
presented in Table 2.  The results presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 show that 
proxies for repatriation tax burdens that use U.S. statutory rates instead of U.S. marginal 
tax rates are also positive and significantly related to changes in cash holdings.   
The BEA data include detailed information on where firms have foreign 
operations, so it is possible to use data on subsidiary host country tax rates to compute an 
alternative proxy for repatriation tax burdens, the Effective Repatriation Tax Rate.  Table 
4 presents results of specifications that include this variable in regressions on the cash 
                                                 
16 This variable is winsorized at the 1% level in each tail of the distribution.   18
holdings variable used in the Table 2 regressions.  Since the Effective Repatriation Tax 
Rate is a measure of exposures to tax costs based on stocks of multinational activity, it is 
appropriate to use it in specifications explaining levels of cash holdings.  The sample is 
drawn from the 1982, 1989, 1994, and 1999 BEA benchmark years, and it includes only 
those observations in which Compustat can be matched with BEA data. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The positive and significant coefficient on the Effective Repatriation Tax Rate 
(Net PPE Weighted) in column 1 indicates that firms facing higher tax consequences of 
repatriating earnings hold more cash.  The coefficient on the Alternative Effective 
Repatriation Tax Rate (Net PPE Weighted) is also positive and significant and slightly 
larger in magnitude.  Measures of effective repatriation tax rates computed with 
employment to weight foreign tax rates and the share of firm activity abroad also have a 
positive impact on consolidated cash holdings, as indicated in columns 3 and 4.
17  In each 
of the specifications presented in Table 4, the controls have effects that are very similar to 
the effects estimated in Table 2. 
Taken together, Tables 2, 3, and 4 present consistent evidence that the tax costs of 
repatriating foreign earnings significantly increase consolidated cash holdings.  This 
finding appears in our analysis of the levels of cash holdings as well as changes in cash 
holdings, and it is robust across a variety of measures of the tax burden of repatriations. 
 
4.2. Domestic and foreign cash holdings 
 
  If repatriation tax burdens increase cash holdings, they should increase cash held 
abroad, and if cash held abroad substitutes for cash held domestically, then higher 
repatriation tax burdens could reduce domestic cash holdings.  The results in Tables 2, 3, 
                                                 
17 As noted in footnote 13, the Effective Repatriation Tax Rate might be a poor proxy for the tax burden of 
repatriation if levels of affiliate activity do not indicate levels of accumulated earnings because of 
differences in affiliate age.  To consider this possibility, specifications that include average affiliate age and 
average affiliate age interacted with measures of effective repatriation tax rates are included in the 
specifications presented in Table 4.  The coefficients on these variables are not significant, and their 
inclusion does not change the size or significance of coefficients on the effective repatriation tax rates in a 
meaningful way.   19
and 4 indicate that repatriation tax costs increase consolidated cash holdings, which is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that U.S. cash reductions completely offset higher 
foreign cash holdings.  The data shown in Fig. 2 and the specifications presented in 
Tables 5 and 6 shed further light on these hypotheses.  Fig. 2 shows the median share of 
cash held abroad by U.S. multinationals that face above and below average effective 
repatriation tax rates, computed using net PPE weights.  The median firm facing above 
average rates holds 47% of its cash abroad, but the median firm facing below average 
rates holds only 26% of its cash abroad.  This figure suggests that repatriation tax burdens 
increase foreign cash holdings relative to domestic cash holdings.  Tables 5 and 6 present 
results of studying the effects of repatriation tax burdens on cash holdings in each of 
these locations in a regression framework. 
 
[Fig. 2 about here] 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 The specifications presented in Tables 5 and 6 are identical to those presented in 
Table 4, except the numerator of the dependent variable is foreign cash holdings for the 
analysis presented in Table 5 and domestic cash holdings for the analysis presented in 
Table 6.  The sample used for these tests is the subset of observations that appear in both 
Compustat and the BEA data that report both domestic and foreign cash holdings.
18  In 
Table 5, the coefficients on the effective repatriation tax rate variables are all positive, 
statistically significant, and larger in magnitude than the coefficients on these variables in 
Table 4.  In fact, each measure of effective tax rates has an effect on foreign cash 
holdings that is more than twice as large as its effect on consolidated cash holdings.  
Thus, repatriation tax burdens appear to affect where the cash is held. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
                                                 
18 Because only certain affiliates and parents report cash holdings, the sample is smaller than the sample 
used in the analysis presented in Table 4.   20
  The tests presented in Table 6 estimate the effect of repatriation tax burdens on 
domestic cash holdings.  Although the point estimates of the coefficients on the effective 
repatriation tax rate variables are all negative, which is consistent with lower U.S. cash 
holdings offsetting higher foreign cash holdings, they are not statistically significant.   
Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that firms facing higher tax costs of repatriation 
hold less cash domestically.  Several factors limit the extent to which cash held abroad 
can substitute for cash held domestically.  As a consequence of the tax costs of 
repatriations and the limits on other methods of relocating cash to the U.S., foreign 
retained earnings are costly to access.  In addition, capital providers to the domestic 
operations of a multinational are skeptical about the extent to which cash held abroad is a 
pledgeable asset because of the territorial nature of bankruptcy law.  There is a 
remarkable void in the laws governing multinational bankruptcies, but respect for the 
laws of the country in which a firm is operating implies that local bankruptcy rules apply 
to the resolution of insolvency proceedings involving a multinational affiliate and that 
lenders to the U.S. parent may have trouble obtaining assets held abroad.
19  
  Other variables have distinct effects in explaining cash held abroad and 
domestically.  The regressions indicate that Foreign Income/Total Assets has a large 
positive effect on cash held abroad while Domestic Income/Total Assets has a large 
positive effect on cash held domestically.  These results provide evidence that more 
profitable operations hold more cash even within firms.  The results also indicate that 
firms with high levels of leverage hold less cash both domestically and abroad.  In 
addition, most firm characteristics computed using consolidated firm data, like the Log of 
Assets, the Dividend Dummy, the Standard Deviation of Operating Income, and Capital 
Expenditures/Total Assets, significantly affect domestic cash holdings, but have smaller 
and often statistically insignificant effects on foreign cash holdings.  The estimates of the 
coefficients on these variables may simply reflect the relatively large importance of 
domestic activity for most firms. 
                                                 
19 Desai, Foley, and Hines (2003) offers a detailed discussion of the workings of multinational bankruptcies 
and the reasons why local laws should dictate the bankruptcy terms of multinational affiliates.   
Additionally, Bebchuk and Guzman (1999) provide a useful analysis of the tension between local and 
universal principles for multinational bankruptcies with particular reference to the United States, and 
Tagashira (1994), Gitlin and Flaschen (1987), and Powers (1994) discuss various efforts at international 
bankruptcy cooperation and their shortcomings.   21
The coefficients on R&D Expenditures/Total Assets are positive and significant in 
both Tables 5 and 6, illustrating that R&D intensive firms hold more cash both abroad 
and at home.  These results suggest that the high cash holdings of these firms are at least 
partially tax motivated.  Previous work interprets the effects of R&D expenditures on 
cash holdings as indicating that firms with higher costs of obtaining external finance hold 
more cash for precautionary reasons.  However, because the average U.S. multinational 
firm in the sample conducts 89.8% of its R&D in the U.S., the precautionary motive is 
likely to result in high domestic, not foreign, cash holdings.  The effects of R&D on 
foreign cash holdings is consistent with the hypothesis that R&D intensive firms are 
better able to shift profits to low tax foreign locations.  This hypothesis is analyzed in 
more detail in the next section.   
 
4.3. Affiliate cash holdings 
 
  The results in Tables 2-6 show that firms facing higher repatriation tax burdens 
hold more cash and that repatriation tax burdens specifically affect the level of cash held 
abroad.  The analysis presented in Tables 7 and 8 looks across affiliates and explores if 
firms hold more cash in foreign locations from which it is very costly to repatriate 
earnings.  In addition, our tests consider whether financial constraints limit the ability of 
firms to avoid repatriation tax burdens and if, given their ability to relocate profits, 
technology intensive firms have cash holdings that are particularly sensitive to 
repatriation tax burdens.   
 
4.3.1 The effect of taxes 
 
Individual affiliates face tax costs of repatriation that vary inversely with their 
host country tax rates.  These tax costs are not relevant to branch affiliates as the U.S. 
taxes the foreign income of these affiliates as it is earned, not as earnings are repatriated.  
The specifications presented in Table 7 regress affiliate level cash holdings on measures 
of the affiliate’s host country tax rate, a dummy equal to one for affiliates organized as 
branches and zero otherwise, and a set of controls.  The dependent variable in these   22
specifications is the natural logarithm of the ratio of affiliate cash holdings to affiliate 
total assets less affiliate cash holdings.  The sample includes all affiliates that report cash 
holdings.  The specifications in columns 1 and 2 include fixed effects for each three digit 
BEA industry code and each year, and those in columns 3 and 4 include fixed effects for 
each parent firm and each year.   
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
The -0.8908 coefficient on Country Tax Rate in column one indicates that 
affiliates in countries with low tax rates, which imply high tax costs of repatriating 
earnings, hold more cash.  This estimate indicates that a one standard deviation decrease 
in the Country Tax Rate is associated with 10.6% higher ratio of affiliate cash holdings to 
affiliate assets less affiliate cash holdings.  Branch Dummy is significantly negative in 
this specification, consistent with the hypothesis that affiliates organized as branches hold 
lower levels of cash because they do not have repatriation tax incentives to hold cash.   
The specification in column 2 adds the interaction of the Branch Dummy and the 
Country Tax Rate as an explanatory variable.  The coefficient on this variable captures 
the marginal difference in the effect of host country tax rates on affiliate cash holdings 
for affiliates organized as branches, relative to the effect for affiliates with other 
organizational forms.  It is of roughly the same magnitude and the opposite sign of the 
coefficient on the Country Tax Rate variable.  This implies that unlike the cash holdings 
of incorporated affiliates, cash holdings of branches are not sensitive to the affiliate’s host 
country tax rate, as one would expect given that there are no tax costs associated with 
repatriations for branches.  Instead of industry and year fixed effects, the specifications 
presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 include parent and year fixed effects, and the 
results are very similar in these specifications.  Parent fixed effects control for time 
invariant firm characteristics that could affect cash holdings.  These specifications 
identify the effect of taxes by comparing levels of cash holdings of different affiliates of 
the same firm. 
 
   23
4.3.2 The effect of taxes for financially constrained and technology intensive firms 
 
We also examine whether the sensitivities of cash holdings to repatriation tax 
burdens affect different firms differently.  If a firm is financially constrained 
domestically, it may not be able to defer taxes due on foreign earnings by holding these 
earnings abroad.  The specifications presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 8 consider 
this possibility.  These specifications include the Financial Constraint Dummy as an 
indicator variable that is equal to one for firms that both have domestic leverage that 
exceeds the sample median and that have a debt rating that is below investment grade or 
have no debt rating.
20  In addition to entering on its own, this variable is also interacted 
with the Country Tax Rate.   
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
The coefficient on the Financial Constraint Dummy is negative, indicating that 
firms facing financial constraints hold less cash.  The coefficient on this variable 
interacted with the Country Tax Rate is positive and slightly smaller in magnitude than 
the coefficient on the Country Tax Rate variable on its own.  An F-test reveals that the 
sum of these two coefficients is statistically indistinguishable from zero.  Similar results 
are obtained from the specification presented in column 2 that includes parent and year 
fixed effects instead of industry and year fixed effects.  Thus, financially constrained 
firms not only hold less cash, but their cash holdings are less sensitive to the tax costs of 
repatriating earnings.   
  Technology intensive firms may find it easier than other firms to satisfy the 
requirements of international tax authorities while shifting profits to low tax jurisdictions.  
These firms may recognize larger profits in low tax jurisdictions and hold more cash in 
these jurisdictions than other firms.  As a consequence, affiliates of technology intensive 
firms may exhibit a higher sensitivity of cash holdings to host country tax rates than 
                                                 
20 Because data on debt ratings comes from Compustat, the sample used in Table 8 includes only data on 
affiliates of firms that can be matched with Compustat data.   24
affiliates of other firms.  To test this possibility, the specifications in columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 8 include Domestic R&D/Domestic Assets interacted with Country Tax Rate.   
  In these specifications, the coefficient on Domestic R&D/Domestic Assets 
interacted with host country tax rates is negative, large in magnitude, and statistically 
significant.  In the specification in column 4, the coefficient on Country Tax Rate is          
-0.7350, and this coefficient indicates the effects of host country tax rates for firms with 
zero domestic R&D.  The -15.4390 coefficient on the interaction of Domestic 
R&D/Domestic Assets and Country Tax Rate, together with the 0.0456 standard deviation 
of  Domestic R&D/Domestic Assets, implies that increasing Domestic R&D/Domestic 
Assets from zero by one standard deviation changes the sensitivity of affiliate cash 
holdings to country tax rates by -0.7048, or nearly doubles the sensitivity of affiliate cash 
holdings to host country tax rates.  In other words, technology intensive firms appear to 




  Understanding the extent to which firms hold cash has been a part of the academic 
research agenda in finance for more than fifty years.  Much of the work in this field 
emphasizes transactions costs, the difficulties associated with obtaining external finance, 
and agency considerations.  This study indicates that taxes also have significant effects on 
the cash balances of U.S. firms.   
  We find that U.S. multinational firms that would trigger larger tax expenses by 
repatriating earnings have higher consolidated cash holdings.  Analysis of detailed data 
on the domestic and foreign operations of these firms shows that repatriation tax burdens 
increase cash held abroad and that these higher foreign cash holdings are not directly 
offset by lower domestic cash holdings.  Furthermore, affiliates in countries with low tax 
rates, which imply high tax costs of repatriating earnings, hold more cash than other 
affiliates of the same firm.  The sensitivity of affiliate cash holdings to repatriation taxes 
is particularly pronounced for technology intensive firms but is not observed for 
financially constrained firms.   25
  While this tax-based explanation for cash holdings has not received much 
attention in prior academic literature, it has captured the attention of policy makers.  In 
October of 2004, the American Job Creation Act was passed by Congress and signed into 
law by President Bush.  This Act provides for a one-time, 85 percent tax deduction for 
repatriated earnings.  This deduction implies that eligible repatriated earnings face a 
maximum U.S. rate of 5.25 percent instead of 35 percent.
21  Proponents of the Act argued 
that U.S. multinationals hold large sums of cash abroad as a consequence of the methods 
used to tax foreign earnings and that the repatriation of these funds would spur 
investment and job growth in the U.S.  Although it is still too early to tell if the American 
Job Creation Act of 2004 is having the effects its proponents argue it should, it does 
appear that high repatriation tax burdens encourage firms to hold cash abroad.  
 
                                                 
21  The act allows U.S. multinational firms to deduct 85% of cash dividends received from foreign 
subsidiaries, where the dividends are received in either the year preceding or subsequent to the enactment 
of the act.  To be eligible, the dividend must (i) exceed the average dividend received over three out of the 
last five tax years, (ii) be reinvested in the U.S. for defined purposes, including, job creation, infrastructure 
development, research and development, and capital investment, and (iii) be less than $500 million, unless 
an amount greater than this is reported as permanently reinvested earnings in the prior year's financial 
statements.   26
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 Fig. 1: Median Cash/Net Assets and Repatriation Tax Rates: This figure displays the median ratio of cash to total
assets less cash for firms with above and below average Effective Repatriation Tax Rates. The Effective Repatriation
Tax Rate is computed by first taking the maximumof zero and the difference between the weighted foreign tax rate a firm
faces and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b). Then this value is multiplied by the share of
firm activity abroad. Weighted foreign tax rates are computed using net property plant and equipment in each country as
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Tax RateFig. 2: Median Share of Cash Held Abroad and Repatriation Tax Rates: This figure displays the median ratio of cash 
held abroad to total cash for firms with above and below average Effective Repatriation Tax Rates .  The Effective 
Repatriation Tax Rate  is computed by first taking the maximum of zero and the difference between the weighted foreign 
tax rate a firm faces and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b). Then this value is multiplied by 
the share of firm activity abroad.  Weighted foreign tax rates are computed using net property plant and equipment in each 
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Variables Computed Using Compustat Data
Ln (Cash/Net Assets) -2.8687 -2.8728 1.7244
Change in Cash/Net Assets -0.0110 -0.0005 0.1537
Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings (Full Compustat sample) 0.0008 0.0000 0.0038
Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings (Firms reporting foreign income) 0.0017 0.0000 0.0048
Alternative Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings (Full Compustat 
sample) 0.0011 0.0000 0.0045
Alternative Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings (Firms reporting 
foreign income) 0.0026 0.0000 0.0064
Domestic Income/Total Assets 0.0106 0.0447 0.0305
Foreign Income/Total Assets 0.0404 0.0000 0.2174
Log of Assets 6.4908 6.1968 1.2911
Dividend Dummy 0.5507 1.0000 0.4974
Book Value of Equity/Market Value of Equity 0.5925 0.4963 0.7427
Standard Deviation of Operating Income 0.0559 0.0450 0.0453
R&D Expenditures/Total Assets 0.0262 0.0000 0.0538
zero and the difference between the weighted foreign tax rate a firm faces and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham 
(1996b). Then this value is multiplied by the share of firm activity abroad.  For Net PPE weighted measures, weighted foreign tax rates 
are computed using net property plant and equipment in each country as weights and the share of net property plant and equipment 
abroad as the share of firm activity abroad.  Employment weighted measures use employment in place of Net PPE.  Alternative Effective 
Repatriation Tax Rates  are computed similarly, but U.S. statutory tax rates are used in place of marginal tax rates.  Country Tax Rate  is 
the annual median income tax rate paid by affiliates in a particular host country. Branch Dummy takes a value of one if the affiliate is 
organized as a branch and zero otherwise.  Affiliate Net Income/Affiliate Assets  is the ratio of affiliate net income to affiliate assets.  Log 
of  Affiliate Assets  is the natural logarithm of affiliate assets.  Standard  Deviation of Affiliate Net Income/Affiliate Assets  is the standard 
deviation of the ratio of affiliate net income to affiliate assets measured over the entire 1982-1999 period using annual data.  Domestic 
R&D/Domestic Assets is the ratio of domestic R&D expenditures to domestic assets, and Affiliate R&D/Affiliate Assets is the ratio of 
affiliate R&D expenditures affiliate assets.  Affiliate Capital Expenditures/Affiliate Assets  is the ratio of affiliate capital expenditures to 
affiliate assets.  Affiliate Leverage is the ratio of affiliate current liabilities and long term debt to affiliate assets.  Financial Constraint 
Dummy is a dummy equal to one if the firm's domestic leverage is above the sample median and the firm has a below investment grade 
debt rating or has no debt rating and zero otherwise.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
The top panel of this table provides descriptive statistics for variables computed using Compustat data and the bottom panel for variables 
computed using BEA data.  Ln(Cash/Net Assets) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash to total assets less cash.  Change in 
Cash/Net Assets is the first difference in the ratio of cash to total assets less cash.  The Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings  is computed 
by first subtracting foreign taxes paid from the product of a firm's foreign pretax income and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated 
in Graham (2000). Then the maximum of this difference or zero is scaled by total firm assets.  The Alternative Tax Cost of Repatriating 
Earnings is computed similarly, but U.S. statutory tax rates are used in place of marginal tax rates.  Domestic Income/Total Assets and 
Foreign Income/Total Assets  are ratios of domestic and foreign pretax income to total  assets, respectively.  Log of Assets is the natural 
logarithm of total firm assets. Dividend Dummy is a dummy equal to one if the firm pays cash dividends and zero otherwise.  Book Value
of Equity/Market Value of Equity is the ratio of the book value of common equity to the market value of common equity.  Standard 
Deviation of Operating Income  is the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets, measured by 
firm over the entire sample period.  R&D Expenditures/Total Assets and Capital Expenditures/Total Assets  are ratios of research and 
development expenditures and capital expenditures to total assets, respectively.  Market Leverage is the ratio of long and short term debt 
to the sum of long and short term debt and the market value of equity.  Ln(Foreign Cash/Net Assets) is the natural logarithm of the ratio 
of cash held abroad to total assets less total cash.  Ln(Domestic Cash/Net Assets) is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash held 
domestically to total assets less total cash. Ln(Affiliate Cash/Affiliate Net Assets)  is measured as the natural logarithm of the ratio of 
affiliate cash to affiliate total assets less affiliate cash.  The Effective Repatriation Tax Rate  is computed by first taking the maximum of Capital Expenditures/Total Assets 0.0724 0.0523 0.0741
Market Leverage 0.2629 0.1974 0.2482
Variables Computed Using BEA Data
Ln (Foreign Cash/Net Assets) -4.9414 -4.6323 1.8424
Ln (Domestic Cash/Net Assets) -4.0555 -4.0322 1.7235
Ln (Affiliate Cash/Affiliate Net Assets) -3.9495 -3.5589 2.3580
Effective Repatriation Tax Rate (Net PPE Weighted) 0.0054 0.0000 0.0149
Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rate (Net PPE Weighted) 0.0092 0.0015 0.0201
Effective Repatriation Tax Rate (Employment Weighted) 0.0068 0.0000 0.0177
Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rate (Employment Weighted) 0.0117 0.0024 0.0240
Country Tax Rate 0.3512 0.3777 0.1190
Branch Dummy 0.0644 0.0000 0.2455
Affiliate Net Income/Affiliate Assets 0.0604 0.0564 0.1711
Log of Affiliate Assets 10.5161 10.4337 1.5433
Standard Deviation of Affiliate Net Income/Affiliate Assets 0.1032 0.0764 0.0899
Domestic R&D/Domestic Assets 0.0369 0.0202 0.0456
Affiliate R&D/Affiliate Assets 0.0070 0.0000 0.0196
Affiliate Capital Expenditures/Affiliate Assets 0.0619 0.0316 0.0974
Affiliate Leverage 0.5580 0.5327 0.3254
Financial Constraint Dummy 0.1972 0.0000 0.3979Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.0686 -0.2270 -0.0602 -0.2018
(0.1194) (0.1596) (0.1193) (0.1534)
Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings 14.0746 *** 16.5610 ***
(2.7850) (3.7931)
14.5401 *** 13.7678 ***
(2.6357) (2.6352)
Domestic Income/Total Assets 0.0715 0.0360 0.0749 0.0479
(0.0514) (0.0562) (0.0519) (0.0624)
Foreign Income/Total Assets 1.2989 *** 1.9875 *** 0.9394 * 1.3320 ***
(0.4738) (0.5501) (0.5020) (0.5044)
Log of Assets -0.1206 *** -0.0908 *** -0.1205 *** -0.0908 ***
(0.0157) (0.0208) (0.0157) (0.0201)
-0.3107 *** -0.3549 *** -0.3081 *** -0.3336 ***
(0.0402) (0.0585) (0.0402) (0.0529)
-0.0737 *** -0.0980 *** -0.0738 *** -0.0552 *
(0.0180) (0.0349) (0.0180) (0.0286)
Standard Deviation of Operating Income 3.1214 *** 3.7011 *** 3.0903 *** 3.5940 ***
(0.4572) (0.6746) (0.4557) (0.5741)
R&D Expenditures/Total Assets 7.0555 *** 6.3412 *** 7.0379 *** 6.4816 ***
(0.6448) (0.5334) (0.6437) (0.4914)
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets -2.1115 *** -2.7585 *** -2.1150 *** -2.4299 ***
(0.2944) (0.5965) (0.2946) (0.4922)
Market Leverage -1.8573 *** -1.8919 *** -1.8628 *** -1.8334 ***
(0.0799) (0.1210) (0.0800) (0.1058)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects? YYY Y
No. of Obs. 34,319 12,337 34,319 15,231




Book Value of Equity/Market Value of Equity
Alternative Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings
This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions explaining a firm's cash holdings as a function of the tax costs of 
repatriating earnings, along with other variables.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash to total assets 
less cash.  The Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings  is computed by first subtracting foreign taxes paid from the product of a firm's 
foreign pretax income and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b). Then the maximum of this difference or 
zero is scaled by total firm assets.  The Alternative Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings  is computed similarly, but U.S. statutory tax 
rates are used in place of marginal tax rates.  Domestic Income/Total Assets and Foreign Income/Total Assets  are ratios of domestic 
and foreign pretax income to total assets, respectively.  Log of Assets is the natural logarithm of total firm assets.  Dividend Dummy 
is a dummy equal to one if the firm pays cash dividends and zero otherwise.  Book Value of Equity/Market Value of Equity is the 
ratio of the book value of common equity to the market value of common equity.  Standard Deviation of Operating Income  is the 
standard deviation of the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets, measured by firm over the entire sample 
period.  R&D Expenditures/Total Assets and Capital Expenditures/Total Assets  are ratios of research and development 
expenditures and capital expenditures to total assets, respectively.  Market leverage is the ratio of long and short term debt to the 
sum of long and short term debt and the market value of equity.  Each specification includes industry and year fixed effects.  
Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors by firm are presented in parentheses.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Cash Holdings and Tax Costs of Repatriating EarningsDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.0183 *** 0.0004 0.0183 *** 0.0087 ***
(0.0044) (0.0063) (0.0044) (0.0038)
Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings 1.2650 *** 1.0540 ***
(0.3031) (0.3418)
0.8362 *** 0.7246 ***
(0.3248) (0.3342)
Domestic Income/Total Assets -0.0042 -0.0063 -0.0039 -0.0067
(0.0073) (0.0070) (0.0073) (0.0074)
Foreign Income/Total Assets 0.1346 *** 0.0649 0.1379 *** 0.0575
(0.0363) (0.0459) (0.0343) (0.0387)
Change in Log of Assets -0.0318 *** -0.0325 *** -0.0318 *** -0.0360 ***
(0.0077) (0.0108) (0.0077) (0.0102)
0.0053 0.0009 0.0053 -0.0004
(0.0041) (0.0068) (0.0041) (0.0058)
-0.0070 *** -0.0036 -0.0071 *** -0.0050 **
(0.0014) (0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0023)
Standard Deviation of Operating Income -0.0219 -0.0313 -0.0224 -0.0585
(0.0343) (0.0501) (0.0345) (0.0414)
Change in R&D Expenditures/Total Assets -0.8011 *** -1.0978 *** -0.7988 *** -1.0820 ***
(0.1548) (0.1727) (0.1544) (0.1512)
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets -0.2192 *** -0.2342 *** -0.2191 *** -0.2317 ***
(0.0222) (0.0427) (0.0222) (0.0376)
Change in Market Leverage -0.0367 *** -0.0450 *** -0.0365 *** -0.0443 ***
(0.0082) (0.0128) (0.0081) (0.0125)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects? YYYY
No. of Obs. 31,083 11,785 31,083 14,304
R-Squared 0.0468 0.0573 0.0465 0.0542
Alternative Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings
Table 3
Changes in Cash Holdings and Tax Costs of Repatriating Earnings
This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions explaining changes in a firm's cash holdings as a function of the tax costs of 
repatriating earnings, along with other variables.  The dependent variable is the first difference in the ratio of cash to total assets less 
cash.  The Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings  is computed by first subtracting foreign taxes paid from the product of a firm's foreign 
pretax income and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b). Then the maximum of this difference or zero is scaled 
by total firm assets.  The Alternative Tax Cost of Repatriating Earnings  is computed similarly, but U.S. statutory tax rates are used in 
place of marginal tax rates.  Domestic Income/Total Assets and Foreign Income/Total Assets  are ratios of domestic and foreign pretax 
income to total assets, respectively.  Change in Log of Assets  is the first difference in the natural logarithm of total firm assets.  
Dividend Dummy is a dummy equal to one if the firm pays cash dividends and zero otherwise, and the change in this variable is its first 
difference.  Change in Book Value of Equity/Market Value of Equity  is the first difference in the ratio of the book value of common 
equity to the market value of common equity, measured as of year end.  The Standard Deviation of Operating Income  is the standard 
deviation of the ratio of operating income before deprciation to total assets, measured by firm over the entire sample period.  The 
Change in R&D Expenditures/Total Assets  is the first difference in the ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets.  
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets  is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets.  Change in Market leverage  is the first difference in 
the ratio of long and short term debt to the sum of long and short term debt and the market value of equity.  Each specification includes 
industry and year fixed effects.  Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors by firm are presented in parentheses.   *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Change in Cash/Net Assets
Change in Dividend Dummy
Change in Book Value of Equity/Market 
Value of EquityDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -2.1456 *** -1.9655 *** -1.7861 *** -1.7823 ***
(0.1952) (0.1892) (0.1954) (0.1872)
Effective Repatriation Tax Rate 3.6561 **







Domestic Income/Total Assets 0.3655 0.3869 0.3767 0.4679
(0.3872) (0.3531) (0.3893) (0.3575)
Foreign Income/Total Assets 3.1768 *** 2.3863 *** 3.1780 *** 2.2402 ***
(0.8601) (0.7859) (0.8716) (0.7888)
Log of Assets -0.0997 *** -0.0953 *** -0.0988 *** -0.0964 ***
(0.0242) (0.0231) (0.0242) (0.0231)
-0.1865 ** -0.1929 ** -0.1841 ** -0.1832 **
(0.0807) (0.0756) (0.0811) (0.0758)
-0.0258 -0.0288 -0.0261 -0.0334
(0.0586) (0.0499) (0.0590) (0.0502)
Standard Deviation of Operating Income 5.0798 *** 4.8521 *** 5.1459 *** 4.8186 ***
(1.0161) (0.9193) (1.0201) (0.9230)
R&D Expenditures/Total Assets 6.8751 *** 6.8508 *** 6.8913 *** 6.8978 ***
(0.8549) (0.8216) (0.8560) (0.8257)
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets -3.1005 *** -2.9402 *** -2.9706 *** -2.8622 ***
(0.7813) (0.7243) (0.7828) (0.7271)
Market Leverage -2.0465 *** -2.0561 *** -2.0437 *** -2.0419 ***
(0.1751) (0.1559) (0.1762) (0.1565)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects? YYYY
No. of Obs. 2,374 2,658 2,360 2,644
R-Squared 0.3325 0.3308 0.3300 0.3297
Table 4
Cash Holdings and Effective Repatriation Tax Rates
This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions explaining a firm's cash holdings as a function of the tax costs of repatriating earnings, along 
with other variables.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash to total assets less cash.  The  Effective Repatriation Tax Rate is 
computed by first taking the maximum of zero and the difference between the weighted foreign tax rate a firm faces and its marginal effective tax rate as
calculated in Graham (1996b). Then this value is multiplied by the share of firm activity abroad.  For Net PPE weighted measures, weighted foreign tax 
rates are computed using net property plant and equipment in each country as weights and the share of net property plant and equipment abroad as the 
share of firm activity abroad.  Employment weighted measures use employment in place of Net PPE.   Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rates are 
computed similarly, but U.S. statutory tax rates are used in place of marginal tax rates.   Domestic Income/Total Assets and Foreign Income/Total Assets
are ratios of domestic and foreign pretax income to total assets, respectively.   Log of Assets is the natural logarithm of total firm assets.  Dividend 
Dummy is a dummy equal to one if the firm pays cash dividends and zero otherwise.   Book Value of Equity/Market Value of Equity  is the ratio of the 
book value of common equity to the market value of common equity.   Standard Deviation of Operating Income is the standard deviation of the ratio of 
operating income before depreciation to total assets, measured by firm over the entire sample period.   R&D Expenditures/Total Assets and Capital 
Expenditures/Total Assets are ratios of research and development expenditures and capital expenditures to total assets, respectively.   Market leverage is 
the ratio of long and short term debt to the sum of long and short term debt and the market value of equity.  Each specification includes industry and yea
fixed effects.  Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors by firm are presented in parentheses.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rate (Net 
PPE Weighted)




Book Value of Equity/Market Value of Equity
Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rate 
(Employment Weighted)Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -5.6081 *** -6.0029 *** -5.6204 *** -6.0022 ***
(0.3491) (0.3253) (0.3376) (0.3170)
Effective Repatriation Tax Rate  8.0815 **







Domestic Income/Total Assets -1.5755 ** -1.8849 *** -1.7294 ** -1.8739 ***
(0.7174) (0.6242) (0.6943) (0.6162)
Foreign Income/Total Assets 14.0884 *** 13.3924 *** 14.0474 *** 13.2301 ***
(1.5911) (1.3892) (1.5832) (1.3638)
Log of Assets 0.0378 0.0640 * 0.0333 0.0569 *
(0.0358) (0.0336) (0.0355) (0.0335)
-0.0198 0.0593 -0.0127 0.0729
(0.1409) (0.1357) (0.1395) (0.1350)
0.1673 0.0641 0.1931 * 0.0809
(0.1032) (0.0990) (0.1047) (0.1013)
Standard Deviation of Operating Income 0.8745 1.1667 0.8428 0.9819
(1.4042) (1.3252) (1.3540) (1.2876)
R&D Expenditures/Total Assets 4.3818 *** 4.5577 *** 4.1430 *** 4.3603 ***
(1.0921) (1.0718) (1.0745) (1.0465)
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets -2.1394 ** -2.0440 ** -1.1147 -1.1597
(1.0481) (0.9782) (0.9727) (0.9091)
Market Leverage -1.1403 *** -1.0276 *** -1.1506 *** -1.0267 ***
(0.3219) (0.2968) (0.3188) (0.2947)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects? YYYY
No. of Obs. 1,497 1,681 1,491 1,675
R-Squared 0.2579 0.2512 0.2573 0.2499
Table 5
Foreign Cash Holdings and Effective Repatriation Tax Rates
This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions explaining a firm's foreign cash holdings as a function of the tax costs of repatriating 
earnings, along with other variables.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash held abroad to total assets less total cash.  The 
Effective Repatriation Tax Rate is computed by first taking the maximum of zero and the difference between the weighted foreign tax rate a firm faces 
and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b). Then this value is multiplied by the share of firm activity abroad.  For Net PPE 
weighted measures, weighted foreign tax rates are computed using net property plant and equipment in each country as weights and the share of net 
property plant and equipment abroad as the share of firm activity abroad.  Employment weighted measures use employment in place of Net PPE.  
Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rates are computed similarly, but U.S. statutory tax rates are used in place of marginal tax rates
Domestic Income/Total Assets and Foreign Income/Total Assets are ratios of domestic and foreign pretax income to total assets, respectively.   Log of 
Assets is the natural logarithm of total firm assets.  Dividend Dummy is a dummy equal to one if the firm pays cash dividends and zero otherwise.  
Book Value of Equity/Market Value of Equity  is the ratio of the book value of common equity to the market value of common equity.   Standard 
Deviation of Operating Income is the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets, measured by firm over the 
entire sample period.  R&D Expenditures/Total Assets and Capital Expenditures/Total Assets are ratios of research and development expenditures and 
capital expenditures to total assets, respectively.   Market leverage is the ratio of long and short term debt to the sum of long and short term debt and the 
market value of equity.  Each specification includes industry and year fixed effects.  Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors by firm are 
presented in parentheses.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rate (Net 
PPE Weighted)
Effective Repatriation Tax Rate (Employment 
Weighted)
Ln(Foreign Cash/Net Assets)
Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rate 
(Employment Weighted)
Dividend Dummy
Book Value of Equity/Market Value of EquityDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -3.1223 *** -3.1315 *** -3.1324 *** -3.1850 ***
(0.3559) (0.3323) (0.3586) (0.3337)
Effective Repatriation Tax Rate  -1.8132







Domestic Income/Total Assets 1.7692 ** 1.6839 ** 1.7741 ** 1.7346 **
(0.7492) (0.7078) (0.7552) (0.7184)
Foreign Income/Total Assets -2.4822 -2.4861 * -2.4940 -2.6926 *
(1.5156) (1.4603) (1.5242) (1.4829)
Log of Assets -0.1004 *** -0.1114 *** -0.0989 ** -0.1093 ***
(0.0387) (0.0353) (0.0388) (0.0353)
-0.4595 *** -0.4208 *** -0.4656 *** -0.4192 ***
(0.1331) (0.1295) (0.1349) (0.1312)
0.0949 0.0760 0.0989 0.0791
(0.1067) (0.0950) (0.1075) (0.0958)
Standard Deviation of Operating Income 7.2124 *** 7.3555 *** 7.2407 *** 7.2955 ***
(2.0636) (1.8981) (2.0767) (1.9031)
R&D Expenditures/Total Assets 6.0204 *** 6.1519 *** 5.9727 *** 6.1638 ***
(1.6051) (1.5451) (1.6130) (1.5568)
Capital Expenditures/Total Assets -3.1667 *** -2.5673 *** -3.1413 *** -2.5359 ***
(0.8884) (0.8553) (0.9043) (0.8696)
Market Leverage -1.5487 *** -1.3538 *** -1.5534 *** -1.3530 ***
(0.3074) (0.2800) (0.3113) (0.2826)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects? YYYY
No. of Obs. 1,497 1,681 1,491 1,675
R-Squared 0.2090 0.1985 0.2079 0.1972
Table 6
Domestic Cash Holdings and Effective Repatriation Tax Rates
This table presents estimated coefficients from regressions explaining a firm's domestic cash holdings as a function of the tax costs of repatriating 
earnings, along with other variables.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio of cash held domestically to total assets less total cash.  
The Effective Repatriation Tax Rate is computed by first taking the maximum of zero and the difference between the weighted foreign tax rate a firm 
faces and its marginal effective tax rate as calculated in Graham (1996b). Then this value is multiplied by the share of firm activity abroad.  For Net 
PPE weighted measures, weighted foreign tax rates are computed using net property plant and equipment in each country as weights and the share of ne
property plant and equipment abroad as the share of firm activity abroad.  Employment weighted measures use employment in place of Net PPE.  
Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rates are computed similarly, but U.S. statutory tax rates are used in place of marginal tax rates.   Domestic 
Income/Total Assets and Foreign Income/Total Assets are ratios of domestic and foreign pretax income to total assets, respectively.   Log of Assets is 
the natural logarithm of total firm assets.  Dividend Dummy is a dummy equal to one if the firm pays cash dividends and zero otherwise.   Book Value of 
Equity/Market Value of Equity is the ratio of the book value of common equity to the market value of common equity.   Standard Deviation of 
Operating Income is the standard deviation of the ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets, measured by firm over the entire sample 
period.  R&D Expenditures/Total Assets and Capital Expenditures/Total Assets are ratios of research and development expenditures and capital 
expenditures to total assets, respectively.   Market leverage is the ratio of long and short term debt to the sum of long and short term debt and the market 
value of equity.  Each specification includes industry and year fixed effects.  Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors by firm are presented in 
parentheses.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rate (Net 
PPE Weighted)
Effective Repatriation Tax Rate (Employment 
Weighted)
Ln(Domestic Cash/Net Assets)
Alternative Effective Repatriation Tax Rate 
(Employment Weighted)
Dividend Dummy
Book Value of Equity/Market Value of EquityDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.1275 -0.0733 0.1709 0.2164
(0.1763) (0.1775) (0.2160) (0.2157)
Country Tax Rate -0.8908 *** -1.0343 *** -0.9643 *** -1.1031 ***
(0.1715) (0.1818) (0.1714) (0.1801)
Branch Dummy -0.2623 *** -0.7139 *** -0.2092 *** -0.6228 ***
(0.0741) (0.1702) (0.0755) (0.1728)
Branch Dummy*Country Tax Rate 1.3113 *** 1.2096 ***
(0.4408) (0.4492)
Affiliate Net Income/Affiliate Assets 1.1595 *** 1.1658 *** 0.9134 *** 0.9200 ***
(0.1119) (0.1117) (0.1107) (0.1105)
Log of Affiliate Assets -0.3373 *** -0.3376 *** -0.3329 *** -0.3329 ***
(0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0164) (0.0164)
1.0906 *** 1.0719 *** 0.9515 *** 0.9386 ***
(0.2115) (0.2112) (0.2164) (0.2161)
Domestic R&D/Domestic Assets 1.3504 ** 1.3613 ** 1.6320 * 1.6210 *
(0.5665) (0.5665) (0.9069) (0.9066)
Affiliate R&D/Affiliate Assets -1.4872 -1.4671 -0.8816 -0.8709
(0.9502) (0.9502) (0.9134) (0.9132)
-1.0998 *** -1.1116 *** -1.3119 *** -1.3203 ***
(0.1765) (0.1762) (0.1824) (0.1822)
Affiliate Leverage -0.4867 *** -0.4833 *** -0.4096 *** -0.4066 ***
(0.0608) (0.0608) (0.0622) (0.0621)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects? YY N N
Parent and Year Fixed Effects? NN Y Y
No. of Obs. 19,647 19,647 19,647 19,647
R-Squared 0.1030 0.1034 0.2580 0.2584
Table 7
Affiliate Cash Holdings and Host Country Tax Rates
This table presents regressions of affiliate cash holdings on proxies for the tax costs of repatriating affiliate earnings along with other 
variables.  The dependant variable is measured as the natural log of the ratio of affiliate cash to affiliate total assets less affiliate cash. 
Country Tax Rate  is the annual median income tax rate paid by affiliates in a particular host country.  Branch Dummy takes a value of 
one if the affiliate is organized as a branch and zero otherwise.  Affiliate Net Income/Affiliate Assets  is the ratio of affiliate net income 
to affiliate assets.  Log of  Affiliate Assets  is the natural logarithm of affiliate assets.  Standard  Deviation of Affiliate Net 
Income/Affiliate Assets in the standard deviation of the ratio of affiliate net income to affiliate assets measured over the entire 1982-
1999 period using annual data.  Domestic R&D/Domestic Assets is the ratio of domestic R&D expenditures to domestic assets, and 
Affiliate R&D/Affiliate Assets is the ratio of affiliate R&D expenditures affiliate assets.  Affiliate Capital Expenditures/Affiliate 
Assets is the ratio of affiliate capital expenditures to affiliate assets.  Affiliate Leverage is the ratio of affiliate current liabilities and 
long term debt to affiliate assets.  The specifications in columns 1 and 2 include industry and year fixed effects and those in columns 3 
and 4 include parent and year fixed effects.  Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors by affiliate are presented in parentheses. 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Ln(Affiliate Cash/Affiliate Net Assets)
Standard Deviation of Affiliate Net 
Income/Affiliate Assets
Affiliate Capital Expenditures/Affiliate AssetsDependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.2907 -0.2515 -0.5646 ** -0.4618 **
(0.2174) (0.2206) (0.2237) (0.2272)
Country Tax Rate -1.3415 *** -1.4333 *** -0.4709 -0.7350 **
(0.2238) (0.2210) (0.2876) (0.2888)
Financial Constraint Dummy -0.4567 *** -0.2604 -0.3864 ** -0.2241
(0.1747) (0.1783) (0.1728) (0.1783)
0.8793 ** 0.8896 ** 0.6857 0.7972 *
(0.4404) (0.4380) (0.4367) (0.4373)
Domestic R&D/Domestic Assets -0.0672 0.9447 6.6857 *** 6.2115 ***
(0.6726) (1.0435) (1.4882) (1.6745)
-19.3482 *** -15.4390 ***
(3.8715) (3.9137)
Branch Dummy -0.1962 ** -0.1935 ** -0.2112 ** -0.2064 **
(0.0892) (0.0899) (0.0894) (0.0899)
Affiliate Net Income/Affiliate Assets 1.2669 *** 0.9912 *** 1.2468 *** 0.9735 ***
(0.1318) (0.1294) (0.1314) (0.1291)
Log of Affiliate Assets -0.3105 *** -0.3184 *** -0.3127 *** -0.3204 ***
(0.0190) (0.0191) (0.0190) (0.0191)
0.9135 *** 0.8742 *** 0.8850 *** 0.8517 ***
(0.2654) (0.2701) (0.2650) (0.2696)
Affiliate R&D/Affiliate Assets -0.6708 -0.2102 -0.5576 -0.0745
(1.0600) (1.0047) (1.0605) (1.0048)
-0.8830 *** -1.1388 *** -0.8813 *** -1.1486 ***
(0.2137) (0.2162) (0.2139) (0.2163)
-0.3136 *** -0.2788 *** -0.3108 *** -0.2789 ***
(0.0705) (0.0693) (0.0700) (0.0689)
Industry and Year Fixed Effects? YNYN
Parent and Year Fixed Effects? NYNY
No. of Obs. 13,694 13,694 13,694 13,694
R-Squared 0.1046 0.2375 0.1065 0.2386
Financial Constraint Dummy*Country Tax Rate
Domestic R&D/Domestic Assets*Country Tax 
Rate
Table 8
The Sensitivity of Affiliate Cash Holdings to Host Country Tax Rates:
Effects of Financial Constraints and R&D Intensity
This table presents regressions of affiliate cash holdings on proxies for the tax costs of repatriating affiliate earnings along with other 
variables.  The dependant variable is measured as the natural log of the ratio of affiliate cash to affiliate total assets less affiliate cash. 
Country Tax Rate  is the annual median income tax rate paid by affiliates in a particular host country.  Financial Constraint Dummy  is a 
dummy equal to one if the firm's domestic leverage is above the sample median and the firm has a below investment grade debt rating or has 
no debt rating and zero otherwise.  Domestic R&D/Domestic Assets  is the ratio of domestic R&D expenditures to domestic assets.  Branch 
Dummy takes a value of one if the affiliate is organized as a branch and zero otherwise.  Affiliate Net Income/Affiliate Assets  is the ratio of 
affiliate net income to affiliate assets.  Log of Affiliate Assets is the natural logarithm of affiliate assets.  Standard  Deviation of Affiliate Net
Income/Affiliate Assets  in the standard deviation of the ratio of affiliate net income to affiliate assets measured over the entire 1982-1999 
period using annual data.  Affiliate R&D/Affiliate Assets  is the ratio of affiliate R&D expenditures to affiliate assets.  Affiliate Capital 
Expenditures/Affiliate Assets  is the ratio of affiliate capital expenditures to affiliate assets.  Affiliate Leverage  is the ratio of affiliate current 
liabilities and long term debt to affiliate assets.  The specifications in columns 1 and 3 include industry and year fixed effects and those in 
columns 2 and 4 include parent and year fixed effects.  Standard errors that correct for clustering of errors by affiliate are presented in 
parentheses.  *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Ln(Affiliate Cash/Affiliate Net Assets)
Affiliate Leverage
Standard Deviation of Affiliate Net 
Income/Affiliate Assets
Affiliate Capital Expenditures/Affiliate Assets